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J<sup>r</sup> James Short f

DECEMBER 18th, 1770.

## INFORMATION

FOR

Thos Short

13<sup>th</sup> FebruaryAnchored at the wharf  
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of conquest

JAMES SHORT, nephew of the deceased James Short, Optician in London, and heir of conquest to him; and for Dr. Donald Monro, Physician in London; and John Spottiswood, Solicitor at Law there, his guardians;

AGAINST

THOMAS SHORT, Optician in London.

John, Alexander, James, and Thomas Shorts were all brothers-german.

John, the eldest brother, was bred a painter, went abroad, settled at Virginia, and died some years ago, leaving James Short, his eldest son, and several other children.

Alexander, the second brother, was a cabinet-maker in London, and died unmarried, 5th May 1768, without making any will or settlement of his affairs.

James, the third brother, was an optician at London; and, by his distinguished knowledge in his business, he acquired a considerable fortune, and died unmarried in June 1768, about six weeks after the death of Alexander, the second brother.

Thomas, the youngest, and now the only surviving brother of these four, was lately optician at Leith, and now carries on that business at London, in the house of his deceased brother, James.

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Part of the estate of James, the third brother, all of which he acquired by his own industry, was secured by sundry heritable bonds, granted to him by Hugh Montgomery of Broomlands, upon which he was infest in the lands and estate of Broomlands; and these debts, principal and interest, do now amount to about 2,200l. sterling.

James, the third brother, executed a disposition, by which he specially disposed and conveyed the foresaid heritable bonds and infestments upon the estate of Broomlands, to and in favours of the foresaid Alexander Short, his immediate elder brother, and his heirs and assignees.

This deed contains the following clause: " Reserving nevertheless full power and liberty to me, at any time of my life, and even in the article of death, to revoke and recal these presents at my pleasure, and to uplift, assign, gift, or otherwise dispose of the respective sums before mentioned, as I shall think proper, without consent of the said Alexander Short, or his forefairs, sought or obtained thereto, in the same manner as if these presents had not been granted. But, in case I do not uplift, or otherwise dispose of the subjects above disposed, I hereby declare this present deed to be valid, and to have all the force and effect of a delivered evident, albeit the same be found in my custody, or in the custody of any other person, undelivered at the time of my decease; with the not-delivery whereof I hereby dispense for ever."

The estate of Broomlands was lately purchased, at a judicial sale, by Mr. Hamilton of Bourtreehill, who has brought a process of multiple-poining against the different heirs of Mr. Short, that he might pay safely to the person having the best right.

This process of multiple-poining was remitted to the Lord Kenet, who was ordinary in the ranking of Broomland's creditors; and comparance having been made for Thomas Short, the immediate younger brother, who claimed a right to the heritable bonds as heir of line; and for James Short, the eldest son of the eldest brother, who claimed the same as heir of conquest; the Lord ordinary, upon advising a minute of debate, of this date, pronounced the following interlocutor: " Having considered what is above set forth, prefers the said James Short, the heir of conquest, to the heritable debts in question."

And

July 20th,  
1770.

And to this interlocutor his Lordship adhered, upon advising a representation and answers. Nov. 20th,  
1770.

The heir of line preferred a second representation; whereupon the Lord ordinary made avifandum with the cause to your Lordships, and appointed both parties to give in informations; and, in obedience thereto, this is humbly offered on behalf of James Short, the heir of conquest.

The heir of line did maintain, in the first place, that, upon the supposition that no right whatever was vested in Alexander Short, in respect of his predeceasing the granter; that, in that case, the subjects behoved to fall to Thomas Short, as the heir of line of Alexander, but without the necessity of being so served to him; because heirs of line are the favourites of the law, and are always understood to be called, where it does not appear that they are excluded.

But the heir of conquest must confess, that he cannot perceive the force or justice of this reasoning. Heirs of line are no doubt understood to be called as heirs to the succession of such subjects as devolve to heirs of line, where they are not excluded by a particular destination; but it is equally clear, that, where subjects are conquest, a devise to heirs does entitle the heir of conquest to take, and not the heir of line; so that the argument urged for the heir of line does, in a great measure, resolve into a *petitio principii*, viz. whether the subject would have been understood as conquest, or as heritage, in the person of Alexander?

If it would have been heritage in the person of Alexander, upon the supposition that Alexander had taken the subjects in virtue of the foresaid disposition, there might have been some room for pleading, that the heirs called by that deed were Alexander's heirs of line; but it is, with submission, equally clear, that, if it would have been considered as conquest in the person of Alexander, that, failing of himself, his heir of conquest would be understood to be called to the succession by that deed. *Heirs*, when mentioned generally in any deed, must always be explained *secundum subjectam materiam*. In a personal bond, by *heirs*, are understood the whole nearest of kin of the creditor. The heir of line, as the general heir, may take what, neither by the destination of the proprietor, nor by the operation of the law, belongs to another heir; but they certainly are not entitled to take what, from the nature of the subject,



ject, does not belong to the heir of line, but to the heir of conquest.

The heir of conquest does therefore apprehend, that the supposal of the right never to have been in Alexander, will, by no means, give the succession to the heir of line of Alexander. But, on the other hand, it would naturally seem to follow, that if the right, in favours of Alexander, was totally vacated by his predecease, that the subjects would belong to James Short, as the heir of conquest of James, the granter of the deed, as there is no doubt that the subjects were conquest in his person, and, independent of a special settlement, would have gone to his heir of conquest, preferably to his heir of line.

At the same time, it occurs to the heir of conquest, that the real merits of the present question will fall to be resolved by this other question, viz. whether, if Alexander had taken under his brother's settlement, the subjects would have fallen to be considered as heritage, or as conquest, in his person.

In a settlement of this nature, it makes no difference whether the disponente predeceased or survived the granter, because, although in all such settlements, the granter generally reserves his own life-rent, and full powers of altering, so that he can vacate the settlement any time during his life, yet it falls to be considered as a deed, *de presenti*, by which the fee, though resolvable, does immediately vest in the disponente. If the disposition had been delivered, as it contained both procuratory and precept, the disponente might have immediately taken infeftment, which infeftment, no doubt, would have been resolvable, by the granter's afterwards exercising his reserved powers: but, if no such alteration should be made, the disposition and infeftment would subsist, as a valid and an effectual settlement of the estate, and Alexander's heir behoved to make up his titles, by a special service, as heir to him, and that without distinction, whether he survived or predeceased James Short, the granter; and although, in respect the disposition has continued a personal deed, James's heir may make up titles to the subjects, as heir in special to him, yet it would likewise be competent to him to take, by a general service to Alexander, under the aforesaid deed. In short, the heir of conquest cannot discover how it can, with any reason, be maintained, that one heir must be understood as called under the foresaid deed, in the event of the disponente's surviving

surviving the granter, and, under the very same words, a different heir must be understood as called in the event of predeceasing him; so that the question comes precisely to this, whether the subjects in question were heritage or conquest, in the person of Alexander, taking them under the foresaid disposition.

And, with all submission, the question seems to be attended with no difficulty, as it is clear, that Alexander, taking under the foresaid disposition, would have taken by a singular title. He in no sense can be considered as an heir, or universal successor of the defunct, but merely as a disponent; and however such a disposition might be reduced, at the instance of creditors, as a gratuitous deed to their prejudice, if the disponent had not left other subjects sufficient for their payment, yet it is a clear case, that a brother, taking subjects under such disposition, is not understood to be liable to his debts, as heir, *præceptione hæreditatis*. This has been found in various instances, and, particularly, in three cases, collected in the dictionary. viz. 22d November 1765, Scott *contra* Boswell.—17th December 1662, Lady Spencerfield *contra* Laird Kilbrachmont.—And, 22d December 1664, heirs-portioners of Seton *contra* Seton.

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fol. 35.

The deed falls to be considered as a conveyance, *de presenti*, which is not to be judged of, according to what may accidentally happen to be the case, at the time of the granter's death, but according as things stood at the date of the deed; and as, at the date of the deed, the disposition was not heir *alioqui successurus*, the granter having *hæredes propinquiores in spe*, so the disponent could only be considered as a singular successor, taking the estate by singular titles, and not as universal representative of the defunct.

If a man should disponent his estate to a remote relation, having nearer heirs in existence at the time, and that these nearer heirs should all fail before the death of the granter, it is plain that such disponent could be considered in no other light than as taking the estate by disposition. He could never be considered as heir and universal successor to the defunct. The accident of the nearer heir's dying in the mean time, could never surely alter the case; and as it makes no difference in a question of this kind, whether the disponent's prospect of the succession was more near, or remote, it is sufficient to say, that, at the date of the deed, the disponent was

not *alioqui successurus* in the subjects, but that the granter had *heredes propinquiores*, whether in actual existence or only *in spe*.

If, therefore, Alexander Short would not have been considered, in the eye of law, as taking the subjects under the foresaid deed, *præceptione hereditatis*, but by disposition; and if it would have had no other legal effect against him, than as taking under a singular title, it is humbly thought that these subjects must fall to be considered in his person as conquest, and not as heritage; and that, upon his death, without any particular settlement, they would, of consequence, devolve upon his heir of conquest, and not upon his heir of line.

Lib. II. dieg.  
15. § 17.

Indeed, the opinion of Sir Thomas Craig is in point, for the heir of conquest, in the very case now in hand: "In hoc conquestu notandum est, conquestum non dici, quod quis ex avo vel patre capit, si eo tempore quo capit erat proxime successurus; non enim tum dicitur conquestus, sed tanquam præceptio hereditatis, et qui accipit, pro hærede, saltem universali successore, habebitur; et hoc inter ascendentes et descendentes. Sed in collaterali successione alia ratio est; nam si fratri quid dederit, licet is ei immediate successurus videatur, tamen non censetur præceptio hereditatis, sed merns conquestus, et quasi alienatio in extraneum facta, nisi id expresse dicatur, alienationem factam in fratrem tanquam successurum; nos hæredem apparentem dicimus."

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fol. 297,  
§ 21.

Lord Bankton delivers his opinion in the following words: "Conquest that falls to the heir of conquest is all heritable rights, whereupon investment did or might follow, acquired by the deceased upon singular titles, (*i. e.*) to which he did not succeed as heir, *præceptione hereditatis*, or otherwise."

Lib. ad. tit.  
8, § 6.

In like manner, Mr. Erskine; "Those heritable rights, to which the deceased did himself succeed, as heir to his father, or other ancestor, got sometimes the name of heritage, in a strict sense, in opposition to the *feudanova*, or feus of conquest, which he had acquired by singular titles, and which descend not to his heir of line, but of conquest."

It was said for the heir of line, that if Alexander had survived his brother James, he might have made up titles to the heritable bond by a service as heir of conquest; and that, in that case, there can be no doubt that the subjects would have descended to Alexander's.



der's heir of line, and that it ought to make no difference that he predeceased his brother.

But it is unnecessary to enter into the question, What would have been the consequence if Alexander had outlived his brother, and had, in fact, made up titles to the subjects in question, as heir of conquest? It is sufficient to observe, that having predeceased his brother, he never could be heir to him in any thing; and as his brother had *heredes propinquiores in spe*, both at the date of the disposition and at the time of Alexander's death, the disposition, which is the only right he ever had to the subjects, cannot be considered as a *præceptio hereditatis*. He could, with no propriety be considered as heir to his brother, but entirely as a singular successor.

It was said for the heir of line, that the disposition in favours of Alexander Short did imply the condition of James, the granter's, dying without heirs of his own body, according to the famous law, *de conditionibus et demonstrationibus*, and from thence he concluded, that the subjects in question behoved to be considered as heritage, and not as conquest, for that he fell to be considered as an heir called to the succession, failing the granter's own issue.

But, with all submission, it is not easy to perceive the force of this argument. For supposing that James Short had granted the disposition to a remote relation, or to a mere stranger, the foresaid condition would have been implied in that case, as much as in this; and yet it is impossible to maintain, that the subjects would fall to be considered as heritage in the person of a stranger disponent. The foresaid conditions being implied in the settlement, cannot alter the nature of the right under which Alexander Short did take, or render him an heir in place of a singular successor.

Let it be supposed that the condition, in place of being implied, had been expressed, yet still Alexander would not have taken the estate as heir, but by a singular title, as disponent. The rule of law is, that *positus in conditione non censetur positus in institutione*, supposing that an heir had existed of James Short's body, he could not have taken up the estate upon that disposition, but he behoved to serve heir at law under the former settlements, and, consequently, Alexander Short, notwithstanding such condition had been expressed in the deed, could only be considered as a conditional disponent, taking the estate upon a singular title, and not *præceptione hereditatis*.

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The heir of conquest shall not trouble your Lordships with more words. He humbly apprehends, that in whatever light this matter shall be viewed, it is clearly in his favour. If the disposition shall be understood to have been vacated by the predecease of Alexander the disponee, in that case it is plain that James Short, as heir of conquest to his uncle James, would be intitled to the heritable bond in question; and it is, with submission, equally plain, that as, by the foresaid disposition, the subjects would fall to be considered as conquest in the person of Alexander, that James must, in the other view, be intitled to take them under the character of heir of conquest to Alexander; and therefore, upon the whole, it is humbly hoped that your Lordships will have no difficulty to prefer the heir of conquest.

*In respect whereof, &c.*

**RO. MACQUEEN.**